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Abstract 
 
There can be no doubt that the Bush Administration's policies have massively contributed to a hitherto 
unprecedented deterioration in European-American relations. 
However, European antipathies towards many things American date back at least to July 5, 1776, if not before. 
Following a conceptual discussion of anti-Americanism, the paper then turns to an account of these historical 
dislikes and anchors them particularly among Europe's elites. A discussion of anti-Semitism in relation to anti-
Americanism follows in the subsequent section. A summary of an analysis of newspaper articles collected in 
the decade of the 1990s highlights the widespread nature of anti-American sentiments in Britain, France, 
Germany, Italy. Lastly, anti-Americanism's functionality as a useful ingredient in Europe's burgeoning state 
building process concludes the paper. 
 
 
   2
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction and Definition 
 
  One need not be a diligent student of survey research to know that antipathy towards America and 
Americans has become a worldwide phenomenon.
1 Just a glance at newspaper headlines, editorials, televi-
sion talk shows, as well as casual conversations at parties and dinner tables reveal a widely-held hostility 
towards the United States that remains seemingly unprecedented.  
 
  The study at hand will concentrate on Europe alone though in a comparative context. By any 
measure, American-European relations have reached a nadir over the past few years. No aspect of public 
life has remained immune to this tension fraught with recrimination, antipathy, even open hostility. We 
know that things must be really bad when even the world of accounting, hitherto hardly a hotbed of cul-
tural wars and transatlantic disagreements, recently has witnessed overt hostilities from Europeans towards 
their American colleagues. Thus, Claude Bebear, the chairman of AXA, the French insurer, who compared 
accounting rulemakers to Iranian religious leaders: “Most of them are from the United States, he said, but 
‘there is a super-super-ayatollah who is not even American but is from Scotland’ and ‘has a fascination 
with market value.’”
2 Regardless of the issue involved, about which I claim zero expertise, the tone says it 
all. The German proverb “Der Ton macht die Musik” (“the tone makes the music”) comes to mind. Indeed, 
this proverb’s wisdom will inform much of this study, since the saying clearly denotes the important fact 
that form matters at least as much as substance, or better still, that form is in fact substance. Accordingly, 
this study is as much about the “how” as it is about the “what.” In particular, it will demonstrate that a 
steady – and growing – resentment of the United States (indeed, of most things American) has permeated 
European discourse and opinion since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and thus the end of the bipolar 
world of the Cold War that dominated Europe since 1945. However, it will also argue that the manifest 
                                                 
1By using the term “America” and “American” throughout this study to denote the political entity of “The United 
States of America,” I beg the indulgence of all readers who reside north or south of the respective borders of the 
United States and are thus, of course, “American” though not citizens of the United States. I am using the concepts 
“America” and “American” not in their wider and more accurate geographic meaning but in their much more com-
monly used manner as representing one country, the United States of America. But particularly in a work on “anti-
Americanism,” I feel justified in doing so since the term itself has always applied “exclusively to the United States, 
and not to Canada or Mexico or any other nation of the New World. Many who complain bitterly that the United 
States has unjustifiably appropriated the label of America have nonetheless gladly allowed that anti-Americanism 
should refer only to the United States.” James W. Ceaser, “A genealogy of anti-Americanism,” The Public Interest 
(Summer 2003). 
As to the surveys, the best known is the BBC’s study of eleven countries for the television program, “What The World 
Thinks of America” (BBC News, “Poll suggests world hostile to US”). The show was aired on Tuesday, June 17, 
2003. In addition, there are the following seven studies by the Pew Foundation Survey Reports – Global Atti-
tudes/International: “Views of a Changing World 2003,” June 3, 2003; “America’s Image Further Erodes: Europeans 
Want Weaker Ties,” March 18, 2003; “Among Wealthy Nations...,” December 19, 2002; “What the World Thinks in 
2002,” December 4, 2002; “Americans and Europeans Differ Widely on Foreign Policy Issues,” April 17, 2002; 
“America Admired, Yet Its New Vulnerability Seen as a Good Thing, say Opinion Leaders,” December 19, 2001; and 
“Bush Unpopular in Europe, Seen as Unilateralist,” August 15, 2001. Some of these titles bespeak the afore-
mentioned malaise with and antipathy towards America on the part of much of the world, including Europe. Finally, 
there was a detailed survey conducted in August 2003 by the German Marshall Fund of the United States and Com-
pagnia di San Paolo of Turin in seven European countries (German, France, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland 
and Portugal) and the United States, where the growing and deepening European aversion to America is amply 
documented. 
2Floyd Norris, “Showdown Looms in Europe Over Proposals on Accounting,” The New York Times, July 11, 2003.   3
nature of this antipathy hails from a very long and fertile history and that it is only marginally related to 
dislike of George W. Bush and his administration’s policies. The latter have merely served as convenient 
caricatures for a much deeper structural disconnect between Europe as an emerging political entity and a 
new global player on the one hand, and the United States, its only genuine rival on the other. As this paper 
will argue, anti-Americanism in Europe has long preceded George W. Bush and will persist long after his 
departure. 
 
  Anti-Americanism is a particularly murky concept because it invariably merges antipathy towards 
what America does with what America is – or rather is projected to be in the eyes of its beholders.
3 Thus, it 
has characteristics like any other prejudice in that its holder “prejudges” the object and its activities apart 
from what actually transpires in reality. And just as in the case of any prejudice, anti-Americanism, too, 
says much more about those who hold it than the object of its ire and contempt. But where it differs so 
markedly from “classical” prejudices such as anti-Semitism (about which there will be more in this study), 
homophobia, misogyny and racism, is the fact that unlike in these latter cases – where Jews, gays and 
lesbians, women and ethnic minorities rarely, if ever, have any actual power in and over the majority of 
populations in most countries – the real existing United States most certainly does have power. Because of 
this unique paradox, the separation between what America is – i.e. its way of life, its symbols, products, 
people – and what America does – its foreign policy writ large – will forever be jumbled and impossible 
to disentangle. I would argue that it is precisely because of this fact that – unlike these other prejudices 
which, as a fine testimony to progress and tolerance over the past forty years, have by and large become 
publicly illegitimate in most advanced industrial democracies – anti-Americanism remains not only 
acceptable in many public circles, it has even become commendable, indeed a badge of honor, and perhaps 
one of the most distinct icons of being a progressive these days. After all, by being anti-American, one 
adheres to a prejudice that ipso facto also opposes a truly powerful force in the world. Thus, in the case of 
anti-Americanism, one’s prejudice partially assumes an antinomian purpose, thereby attaining a legitimacy 
in progressive circles that other prejudices – thankfully – do not anymore, at least in the accepted public 
discourse of advanced industrial democracies. Anti-Americanism, as any other prejudice, is an acquired set 
of beliefs, an attitude, an ideology, not an ascribed trait. Thus, it is completely independent of the national 
origins of its particular holder. Indeed, many Americans can be – and are – anti-American, just as Jews can 
be – and are – anti-Semitic, blacks can – and do – hold racist views, and women misogynist ones.
4 The 
reason I am mentioning this is because often the very existence of anti-Americanism is denied by dint of 
Americans also adhering to such positions. It is not a matter of the holder’s citizenship or birthplace that 
ought to be the appropriate criterion but rather her/his set of acquired beliefs about a particular collective. 
But here, too, context means everything. Delighting in Michael Moore’s Bowling for Columbine in an 
artsy movie theater in Ann Arbor, Madison, Cambridge or Berkeley is a completely different experience 
and has a vastly different meaning from having this film become the movie of choice about the United 
States among German youth, including right-wing and left-wing radicals in towns of the former East 
Germany, who use it as a bonding experience between and among them. Bowling for Columbine has 
become far and away the most successful documentary film in German history and Michael Moore’s 
books grace Europe’s bestseller lists, even before they are translated into the local languages.
5 Thousands 
                                                 
3The very best article in recent times on anti-Americanism is Fouad Ajami’s “The Falseness of Anti-Americanism,” 
in Foreign Policy, September 2003.  
4For an excellent article demonstrating how American intellectuals have cultivated anti-American views, see Ian 
Buruma, “Wielding the moral class,” in The Financial Times Weekend Magazine, September 13, 2003. 
5For a fine article showing how Michael Moore’s work has a completely different meaning in the United States and in 
Europe, see Andrian Kreye, “Zugpferd des Antiamerikanismus: Schlecht recherchiert, ohne Kontext: Warum ist Mi-
chael Moore in Europa so erfolgreich?” in Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 11, 2003. The author makes it clear that 
whereas in the United States Moore’s popularity bespeaks his humorous and biting depiction of a conservative ad-
ministration and establishment, in Europe Moore embodies little more than a foil behind which one can safely voice 
one’s anti-Americanism without being accused of holding such a prejudice since – after all – Michael Moore, a bona   4
thronged his lectures on his European tour in December 2003 when he was received like a rock star by an 
adoring public. This had never happened to any other documentary filmmaker, American or European. It 
behooves us to seek an explanation for the reasons of Michael Moore’s immense popularity in 
contemporary Europe. Clearly, the texture of the admiration bestowed upon him by these adoring 
Europeans hails from a source that goes much deeper than disagreements over policy or even the dislikes 
of a particular president and members of his cabinet. Racist lyrics by rappers do not become less racist by 
virtue of their being articulated by African-American artists, but their very quality changes completely 
were the same lyrics uttered by whites. Few people have a more deprecating sense of humor than Jews. 
Yet it makes a whale of a difference whether the jokester is Jewish or not. The content defines but the 
context lends meaning. 
 
  As much as possible, this study is about the is, not the does. I will argue that in Europe, anti-
Americanism has been much more about the essence of America – or put more precisely, the interpretation 
of how Europeans constructed this essence for their own purposes – than its actual activities. This is 
clearly not the case with other manifestations of contemporary anti-Americanism. Thus, for example, as 
my colleague Meredith Woo-Cummings argues in a perceptive paper on changing public opinion in the 
Republic of Korea, Korean antipathies towards the United States have none of the depth, characteristics 
and tradition that their European counterparts have, and remain clearly much more anchored in dislike of 
America’s actual activities – its doing – rather than its character, its essence – its being.
6 Unlike elsewhere 
in the world, at least until very recently, America represented a particularly loaded concept and complex 
entity to Europeans precisely because it was, of course, a European creation which, however, more than 
any other former European extension, consciously defected from its European origins. Anti-Americanism 
in Europe has always been much more about America’s being, as opposed to the rest of the world’s an-
tipathy towards America – which has been much more anchored in its doing.  
 
  To be sure, just as to the Europeans this imagined America served all kinds of purposes, not least 
of which was to delineate a clear “other” to themselves, the exact obverse pertained as well to Americans, 
who throughout their history created all kinds of imagined Europes that fulfilled an “othering” function. 
This America as Europe’s “other” and vice versa has best been characterized as a “compulsive folie à deux 
for over three centuries with a remarkably stable set of choreographies, but with a rather uneven, his-
torically specific set of performances.”
7 However, I perceive an important difference in the respective 
agencies of this folie à deux on the two continents: whereas in the United States the carriers of prejudice 
and antipathy toward Europe have predominated – if at all – in the lower social strata, American elites – 
particularly cultural ones – have consistently extolled Europe, and continue to do so. This love for and 
emulation of European tastes, mores, fashions and habits remained a staple of American elite culture even 
during the country’s most nativist and isolationist periods. It is safe to say that virtually all of America’s 
highbrow culture continues to be European. One need only look at the humanities departments of any lead-
ing American university to observe this continuing cultural hegemony, which, even in the persistent at-
tempt of negating its Eurocentrism, resorts to ideas and methods that are completely European. (Of course 
it goes without saying that those among America’s cultural elites who decry European culture’s hegemony 
in America’s history are equally critical of established American culture and mainstream America. If 
anything, they see the latter merely as a cheapened version of the former.) In massive contrast to the 
outright negative and pejorative – at best ambivalent – notions that the word “American” conjures up in 
                                                                                                                                                               
fide American, says the same things. 
6Meredith Woo-Cummings, “Unilateralism and Its Discontents: The Passing of the Cold-War Alliance and Changing 
Public Opinion in the Republic of Korea,” (unpublished paper, The University of Michigan, 2003.) 
7Berndt Ostendorf, “The Final Idiocy of the Reversed Baseball Cap: Transatlantische Widersprueche in der Ameri-
kanisürungsdebatte,” in Amerikastudien/American Studies 44, 1 (1999); idem, “Why Is American Popular Culture So 
Popular? A View from Europe,” in Amerikastudien/American Studies 46, 3 (2001). I will only look at the European 
side of this folie à deux in this study, not the American.    5
Europe, “European” invariably invokes positive tropes among Americans (elites and mass alike) such as 
“quality,” “class,” “taste,” and “elegance,” be it in food, comfort, tradition, romance, eroticism (as in 
European massage, European decor, European looks and the list can go on). Any resentment of Europe by 
American mass opinion is of a completely different order of magnitude than anti-Americanism’s presence 
in Europe. The risible “freedom fries” had zero traction in any segment of American society. First of all, 
the parallel words to “anti-Americanism” namely “anti-Europism” or “anti-Europeanism” are virtually 
nonexistent. (Indeed, my computer’s spell checker knows neither, as opposed to “anti-Americanism” with 
which it seems totally familiar.) Second, Americans in their history have been known to be anti-French, 
anti-German, anti-Russian, anti-British, and anti-Communist, but never anti-European. To be sure, one im-
portant aspect of acculturation to America was to oppose things from “the old country,” to try to distance 
oneself from the “old world” in an attempt to create a new one. (This, too, changed in the course of the 
twentieth century since by its end the ideology of a multicultural America demanded pride in one’s origins 
as opposed to the ideology of the melting pot of the pre-1960s era which exacted distancing from one’s 
previous culture.) In that sense, one could speak of a distancing from Europe. But this has not been even 
remotely similar to the degree of aversion that anti-Americanism has entailed for Europeans. And here, 
too, there are huge differences by social class and status. “Ordinary” Europeans have never exhibited the 
aversion towards America that their elites have. Indeed, as demonstrated by regular public opinion surveys 
since the early 1960s, a solid majority of Europeans have expressed positive views of America, with only 
about 30 percent holding negative ones. Tellingly, the higher one proceeds on the social scale of the 
respondents, the greater the quantity of negative attitudes towards America becomes. As such, anti-
Americanism is arguably one of the very few prejudices in contemporary Europe which correlate 
positively with education and social status: the higher the education the greater the prejudice. Until the 
mid-1960s, this was also the case with anti-Semitism in Austria and Germany where, since the nineteenth 
century, the most virulent anti-Semites were to be found at universities and among their graduates, such as 
doctors, lawyers and engineers. In the course of the past four decades, conventional anti-Semitism in these 
two countries has assumed the pattern of other kinds of collective prejudices and hatreds: the lesser the 
respondent’s education and the lower her or his social standing, the greater the probability of her or his 
having prejudices and collective dislikes. This has never been the case with anti-Americanism and – as 
will be discussed later – might yet again have received a new twist in terms of anti-Semitism as well. Thus, 
a sort of inverted mirror image has characterized this European-American folie à deux with very different 
weights in their respective agencies: European masses have by and large liked and respected America 
while European elites have certainly not, whereas American elites have liked and respected Europe with 
American masses much less so.  
 
  Perhaps what differentiates the current level and quality of European anti-Americanism from all its 
predecessors is the fact that for the very first time a solid majority of European publics also bear negative 
attitudes towards the United States thus establishing – maybe for the first time – a complete congruity with 
their elites on this topic. There can be no doubt that the Bush Administration’s actions, tone and demeanor 
have greatly contributed to this congruity – this voluntary Gleichschaltung – between European publics 
and elites in terms of their massively felt and politically mobilized anti-Americanism.  
 
  Lest there be any misunderstandings and conceptual uncertainties as to what exactly I mean by 
anti-Americanism, here is the definition offered by Paul Hollander in his superb and definitive book on the 
subject: “Anti-Americanism is a predisposition to hostility toward the United States and American society, 
a relentless critical impulse toward American social, economic, and political institutions, traditions, and 
values; it entails an aversion to American culture in particular and its influence abroad, often also contempt 
for the American national character (or what is presumed to be such a character) and dislike of American 
people, manners, behavior, dress, and so on; rejection of American foreign policy and a firm belief in the   6
malignity of American influence and presence anywhere in the world.”
8 It is a generalized and 
comprehensive normative dislike that often lacks distinct reasons or concrete causes. 
 
  Anti-Americanism is an “ism” thus bespeaking its established institutionalization and common 
usage as a modern ideology. Whereas the word itself might not have been explicitly used until the begin-
ning of the twentieth century, the sentiments that it denotes had been commonly understood and employed 
in Europe since the late eighteenth century, if not before.
9 Anti-Americanism exists: it is visible, palpable, 
audible, readable. Lest we get bogged down in fruitless definitional squabbles, Justice Potter Stewart’s 
famous dictum about pornography (obscenity) pertains here as well: “I shall not today attempt further to 
define the kinds of material I understand to embrace in that shorthand description; and perhaps I could 
never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it....”
10 
  
II. A Brief Historical Overview 
 
  In my research of the topic, I reached back into history in order to ascertain whether the current 
anti-Americanism sweeping Europe is indeed unique. While some of its manifestations might indeed be 
(as will be discussed later), it is also quite clear that there never was a “golden age” in which European 
elites genuinely liked America. To be more precise still, there never existed an era in which European in-
tellectuals and literati – European elites – viewed the United States without a huge residue of ressenti-
ment.
11 As odd as this may seem, this goes back all the way to 1492 and the so-called “discovery” of the so 
called “New World” – what was to become America and the Americas – by Christopher Columbus. As Ira 
Strauss argues in a perceptive paper, a simpler, pre-ideological fear of and ressentiment towards America 
emerged among Europe’s elites – both the aristocracy and the clergy – who understood all too well that the 
changes in the world that Columbus’s journeys wrought could potentially undermine their established 
positions and ordered views.
12 Well before America had any power, and well before it was an independent 
country, tropes emerged in its perception that were to become mainstays of European anti-Americanism to 
this day: venality, vulgarity, mediocrity, inauthenticity but also a clear sense of danger in its undefinable 
but clearly evident attraction. Thus, the argument that it has been America’s disproportionate power when 
compared to Europe’s alleged powerlessness that lies at the heart of European ressentiment towards the 
                                                 
8Paul Hollander, Anti-Americanism: Critiques at Home and Abroad, 1965 - 1990. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992, p. 339 (emphasis in original). In addition to Hollander’s key book on this topic, I would like to mention 
three others that, in my view, offer the most comprehensive analysis on this topic. For Germany, it is clearly Dan 
Diner’s  Feindbild Amerika: Über die Beständigkeit eines Ressentiments (Munich: Propylaen Verlag, 2002). For 
France it is Philippe Roger’s L’Ennemi Américain: Généalogie de l’antiaméricanisme français (Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 2002); and for Canada, Mario Roy’s Pour en finir avec l’antiaméricanisme (Québec: Boréal, 1993). I have yet 
to find comparable books for anti-Americanism in Britain and Italy.  
9“A British economist writing in the Atlantic Monthly in 1901 used the phrase anti-Americanism explicitly, and made 
clear what it was about. To a ‘despairing (European) envy of her prosperity and success’ was coupled a disagreeable 
new sense of impotence, commercial, diplomatic and moral. “Cultured Europeans intensely resent the bearing of 
Americans; they hate the American form of swagger, which is not personal like the British, but national.” Here was a 
country “crudely and completely immersed in materialism.” Little wonder that “anti-Americanism (sic) was on the 
march.” From David W. Ellwood, “A Brief History of European Anti-Americanism” (unpublished paper, delivered at 
the 2003 convention of the Organization of American Historians [OAH], Memphis, Tennessee, April 6, 2003.) 
10Justice Potter Stewart, concurring in Jacobellis v. Ohio (378 U.S. 134, 1964). 
11I am purposely using the French word “ressentiment” instead of the English “resentment” because – as Max Scheler 
in his brilliant treatment of this topic demonstrates – the French term includes dimensions of envy, jealousy and 
above all lingering hate arising from a certain degree of impotence that the English does not. See Max Scheler, Res-
sentiment, edited, with an introduction, by Lewis A. Coser, and translated by William W. Holdheim (Glencoe: The 
Free Press, 1961). Of course the concept of ressentiment plays a central role in Friedrich Nietzsche’s work as well, in 
which it connotes impotence, hatred, envy, and repressed feelings of revenge.  
12 Ira Strauss, “Is it Anti-Americanism or Anti-Westernism?” (Unpublished paper, 2003).   7
United States and things American simply does not hold up. For clearly, even when the United States had 
virtually no power, certainly when compared to the big European players such as Britain and France, 
Europeans bore hostility towards this new entity. From the very beginning until today, European elites 
have continued to view America as this threatening parvenu. By the eighteenth century, Europeans begin 
to depict America as “degenerate,” which is particularly odd since the country had barely been born. The 
French anthropologist Georges Louis Leclerq, better known as Comte de Buffon, argued that, in 
comparison with Africa, Asia, and even South America, North America’s native population was 
particularly retarded and “degenerate” and that this physiological and psychological inferiority somehow 
transferred onto the new European immigrants who, too, regressed once they reached America. According 
to de Buffon, this inevitable process of degeneration initiated via contact with America also affected the 
domestic animals that the Europeans brought with them.
13 Just like their human masters, they regressed 
once contact was made with this New World. Count de Buffon’s “degeneration thesis” gained immense 
popularity and a wide audience among Europe’s elites throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
and was also seconded by other European interpreters of America such as the Dutch naturalist Cornelius de 
Pauw who decried the existence of America as “the worst misfortune” that could have happened to all 
humanity, upsetting even the New World’s dogs who – according to de Pauw – never barked.
14 This view 
of America as “degenerate” has remained a major staple of European elite opinion to this day.
15 As I have 
argued repeatedly, concurring with others, European antipathy towards America can easily be traced to  
July 5, 1776, the beginning of the republic. Thus, Herbert J. Spiro: “Anti-Americanism has been endemic 
among the ruling classes in continental Europe since 1776 at the latest.”
16 No lesser observer of the United 
States than the French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville completely understood – and in part reflected – this 
European ressentiment towards America which already by the early nineteenth century bespoke a clear 
fear of a loss of control on the part of the Europeans, which rested partly in America’s potential as a 
powerful country but also in its undeniable – almost irresistible – attraction, especially to Europe’s masses, 
surely not the aristocracy’s friends. When Tocqueville predicted the rise of Russia and America as the two 
superpowers of the twentieth century, mainly by virtue of their continental expanse, he clearly understood 
that one would be much more attractive and successful than the other: The United States, according to 
Tocqueville, would become a hegemon under the banner of freedom, whereas Russia would do so by 
means of repression. Tocqueville’s claim that the latter would fail whereas the former would flourish not 
only uncannily foresaw the events of the last decades of the twentieth century, but also underlined the 
European elites’ continued fear of and disdain for America.
17 From the get go, there was something eerily 
attractive about the place well beyond the new life that it offered to millions of Europe’s masses. It was 
similar, yet different; weak, yet powerful; repellent, yet attractive. In notable contrast to any other country, 
from the very beginning the enemy for European elites was not “America the Conqueror – not the 
‘Imperial Republic’ – but America the Beguiling.”
18 Nowhere has this consistently powerful sentiment 
been better expressed than in the lyrics of Johnny Hallyday, that self-styled French Elvis Presley, when he 
sings in his song “Quelque chose de Tennessee”: “Cette force, qui nous pousse vers l’infini; Y a peu 
                                                 
13Georges de Buffon, “Of the Varieties in the Human Species,” in Barr’s Buffon. Buffon’s Natural History Con-
taining A Theory Of The Earth, A General History Of Man, Of the Brute Creation, And Of Vegetables, Minerals, Etc. 
(London: T. Gillet, 1807), volume 4 (of 10), pp. 306 - 352. 
14Cornelius de Pauw, “Recherches philosophiques sur les américains” in idem, Oeuvres philosophiques, 1974, 
Volume 1, p. II.  
15Dan Diner discusses de Pauw, de Buffon and other authors and thinkers of the time in his superb Feindbild Ameri-
ka: Über die Bestätigung eines Ressentiments (Munich: Propylaen Verlag, 2002).  
16Herbert J. Spiro, “Anti-Americanism in Western Europe” in Thomas Perry Thornton ed., “Anti-Americanism: Ori-
gins and Context” A special edition of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1988), pp. 124. 
17The ideas regarding Tocqueville hail from an unpublished research proposal that John Torpey wrote in an applica-
tion to Vienna’s IFK. 
18Josef Joffe, “Who’s Afraid of Mr. Big?” in The National Interest (Summer 2001).    8
d’amour avec tell’ment d’envie” [that force which pushes us towards infinity; there is so little love but so 
much desire/envy]. 
 
  In the subsequent few paragraphs I will give examples only from Germany, not because Germany 
represents a special case in Europe’s ressentiment towards the United States, but because I happen to know 
German thinkers and literature better than any other in Europe. Attesting to the Europe-wide nature of this 
phenomenon, one could easily have given parallel examples from Russia, France, Britain or Italy. From 
the late eighteenth century until today a strong negative assessment of things American outdistanced any 
positive views of the United States on the part of German intellectuals and elites. The dichotomy of 
Germany’s “Kultur” vs. America’s “Zivilisation” arose to contrast the latter’s materialism, vulgarity, and 
shallowness to the former’s idealism, nobility, and depth. Beginning with Hegel, virtually all German 
observers condemned the political immaturity of the United States, mainly by virtue of its not having a 
European-style state. As long as the United States failed to establish a European-style polity and state 
structure – and the prognosis looked bad given the size of the country as well as its civil turbulence (which 
was an outgrowth of its multiethnic and immigrant population) – the United States, Hegel concluded, 
would remain forever peripheral to world history. Accordingly, Heine wrote of America: it was a “colossal 
jail of freedom” where “the mob, the most disgusting tyrant of all” carries out “its crude authority.” He 
continued: “You dear German farmers! Go to America! There, neither princes nor nobles exist; there, all 
people are equal; there, all are the same boors!” Jacob Burkhardt equated the allegedly a- and anti-
historical nature of American society with barbarism. He discussed the “a-historical Bildungsmensch” who 
exists in America’s blandness, monotony, mediocrity, and uniformity, and thus whose only escape lay in 
an inevitable – and pathetic – imitation of Europe’s mores and values. Nikolaus Lenau, a major America 
enthusiast before his trip to the United States, was so disappointed in all things American after his arrival 
that he returned to Germany in a completely dejected state, informing his countrymen that there were 
“serious and deep reasons that there were no nightingales and no singing birds at all” in this awful country 
of “worn out people” and “scorched forests.”
19 To the Romantics, America’s “Bodenlosigkeit” 
(rootlessness) was an unforgivable sin. Simon Schama has argued that the flimsy frame construction of 
American houses was prima facie evidence for Germans of America’s rootlessness. This association of 
America with rootlessness became, of course, a major staple of German views of America, well beyond 
the radical right’s and the Nazis’ blood and soil ideology. Thus, for example, in many a current discussion 
pertaining to the alleged advantages of the “Rhenish” as opposed to the American model of economic and 
social management, one often hears that in contrast to the ills of America’s “flexible” labor markets, which 
exact a high degree of geographic mobility by workers, Germans are much more tied to home and hearth.  
 
  Whether the aforementioned German intellectuals had actually visited the United States, as had 
Lenau, or whether they made their judgements from afar (as did Heine, Burkhardt, and Nietzsche), mat-
tered little in terms of their disseminating anti-Americanism among Germany’s intellectuals, political and 
cultural elites, as well as its growing Bildungsbürgertum. Friedrich Nietzsche hated America as the epit-
ome of the modern which he foresaw as the inevitable conqueror of Europe as well. Long in advance of 
Hollywood movies, rock and rap music, the spread of American culture was likened to a form of disease. 
Its progress in Europe seemed ineluctable. “The faith of the American is becoming the faith of the Euro-
pean as well,” Nietzsche warned.”
20 And Nietzsche’s student Arthur Moeller Van den Bruck, “best known 
for having popularized the phrase ‘The Third Reich,’ proposed the concept of Amerikanertum (“American-
                                                 
19Three articles have proven particularly useful for my research on these anti-American attitudes by these giants of 
German culture, politics, literature and philosophy: Manfred Henningsen, “Das Amerika von Hegel, Marx und En-
gels,” in Zeitschrift für Politik (München), 20, 3, 1973; Hartmut Wasser, “Die Deutschen und Amerika,” in Politik 
und Zeitgeschichte (Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament) June 26, 1976; and Guenter Moltmann, “Anti-
Americanism in Germany: Historical Perspectives,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 21, 2 (August 1975). 
20James W. Ceaser, “A genealogy of anti-Americanism” in The Public Interest (Summer 2003).    9
ness) which was to be “not geographically but spiritually’ understood.”
21 Sigmund Freud viewed the 
United States as embodying the most pronounced manifestation of everything that he found despicable in 
modern civilization. It was a place that was solely governed by the almighty dollar, that had “no time for 
libido,” that was simply an “anti-Paradise.” “What is the use of Americans, if they bring no money?” he 
asked Ernest Jones? He confided to Jones that “Yes, America is gigantic, but a gigantic mistake.” At least 
Freud had the good sense to admit that the United States was the embodiment of an enemy he simply could 
not do without, especially after his Civilization and Its Discontents became a bestseller in America, mak-
ing Freud a wealthy man.
22 Peter Gay points out in his superb study of Freud how to Freud America rep-
resented something inferior, primitive, materialistic and prudish, yet at the same time also something im-
mensely seductive, alluring, almost irresistible, thus providing fertile ground for ressentiment in the most 
pronounced Nietzscheian or Schelerian way. Freud’s ambivalence and ressentiment, it seems, were quite 
similar to those expressed by European intellectuals and elites for the past 230 years. And Heidegger 
frequently mentioned “Americanism” as a soulless, greedy, inauthentic force that undermined Europe.  
 
  Unique among Europeans was the Germans’ inordinate extolling of native Americans as “noble 
savages” whom the Germans regarded as their true soul mates in the defense of authentic culture against 
the onslaught of America’s materialist and venal civilization. Nowhere does this theme become more visi-
ble than in the writings of Karl May, whose pulp fiction became a staple of every middle-class child’s – 
particularly boys – reading throughout the twentieth century. May’s books feature a German (presumably 
the author himself) under the assumed name of Old Shatterhand who, together with his blood brother Win-
netou, chief of the Apaches, fights the good fight against an assortment of evil comprising venal English-
men, drunken Scots, cunning Jews, and excessively cruel Comanches and Sioux, their native American 
allies. May’s books feature every anti-American, anti-British, and anti-Semitic trope that was common 
discourse among Germany’s middle class all the way to 1945, if not beyond. The concern with the fate of 
native Americans remains singular to Germans among Europeans’ antagonisms towards America. The 
reasons are obvious: by constantly invoking the genocide of native Americans, Germans can readily point 
to the Americans’ own Holocaust and thus experience some sense of expiation, particularly since they see 
America – driven by its East Coast intellectuals (a convenient code word for Jews) – as Germany’s most 
unforgiving reminder of its Nazi past.
23 To be sure, there were a handful of German intellectuals, writers, 
poets and thinkers who were not particularly anti-American. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe exclaimed that 
“Amerika, Du hast es besser” when in an unusual (for Goethe) quasi-Tocquevillian mood he weighed the 
political advances of American democracy in relation to Europe’s continued autocratic forms of 
government. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were great admirers of the Union and backed it whole-
heartedly in its battle against the Confederacy. Indeed, Marx sent a congratulatory telegram to Abraham 
Lincoln upon his reelection to the presidency of the United States in 1864 to which Lincoln replied in a 
presciently Wilsonian tone by stating that countries do not exist on their own but rather are part of an 
international order to which they need to show commitment and respect for the benefit of humanity (pace 
George W. Bush).
24 But adding validity to my argument about European elites’ disdain for America as 
                                                 
21Ibid. 
22All these quotations are from Peter Gay, Freud: A Life for Our Time (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), pp. 563 and 
570. 
23When Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made his provocative remark about “Old Europe,” with which he 
meant to dismiss the alliance of France and Germany against the Bush Administration’s Iraq policy, the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Germany’s paper of record, published a large article in return wherein it featured the voices of 
many leading French and German intellectuals. Sure enough, one German intellectual, the artist Jochen Gerz, cen-
tered his entire response on America’s marginalization of its native population, thus implying that the United States is 
not a democracy. See Jochen Gerz, “Not in Our Name,” as part of the larger article entitled “Das alte Europa ant-
wortet Herrn Rumsfeld” in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 24, 2003.  
24Gernot Erler, Michael Mueller and Angelica Schwall-Dueren, “Die Geburt einer Nation II,” in Frankfurter Rund-
schau, March 11, 2003. As we will see below, this is a pattern pursued by many European intellectuals in the current   10
embodiment of modern capitalism was the fact that leading members of the political classes in France and 
Britain openly rooted for the Confederacy, which they rightly assumed to be much more akin to their own 
aristocratic ways than was the brash, capitalist, industrial North whose victory would inevitably make the 
United States a formidable political rival for global domination.
25 Lastly, not only German elites and 
intellectuals of the nineteenth century expressed a habitual disdain for America. I would like to mention 
Charles Dickens, Frances Trollope, Knut Hamsun, Evelyn Waugh, Joseph de Maistre and Stendhal as 
eminent representatives of other European cultures.
26 Indeed, it is quite clear that there only exists a Euro-
pean anti-Americanism as opposed to a German, a French, an Italian or a Russian one since the tropes that 
define this prejudice are totally common to (and interchangeable among) all European cultures. In his fine 
study of Austrian Anti-Americanism, Guenter Bischof gives us ample evidence that this ressentiment has 
been alive and well in that country throughout the twentieth century and – just like elsewhere in contem-
porary Europe – might indeed be happily proliferating in the current atmosphere of its perhaps unprece-
dented social acceptability. But, as the author writes in the conclusion of his paper, “Austrian anti-
Americanism today is hardly unique.”
27 Its acuteness might vary from country to country, but its essence 
has remained remarkably steady and similar. 
 
  The period after World War I began to highlight the often irreconcilable bifurcation between the 
European elite’s disdain for America and the European masses’ acceptance of it. While the latter’s leaving 
Europe in waves of emigration to find a home in the New World always bespoke a certain inadvertent at-
traction for the United States, new forms of mass communication rendered this culture clash a constant 
presence in Europe’s daily existence to this day. Whereas in the pre-World War I world, Europeans ex-
pressed their preference for America by voting with their feet so to speak, now they could do so unabash-
edly by dancing the charleston, flocking to movie theaters, idolizing film stars, grooving on jazz, in short 
by making key aspects of American culture part of European life. Needless to say, this, if anything, height-
ened the elite’s ressentiment of America. It was not only jazz that was vilified as decadent “Negermusik” 
promoted by profit-hungry Jews intent on undermining the very fabric of European life. All aspects of 
mass culture were decried as inferior, shallow, tasteless. As such, it should never have incurred the wrath 
of Europe’s elites, since by exhibiting such “qualities” American culture should never have posed any 
threat to something perceived as so greatly superior. But it did – or at least Europe’s elites feared it as such 
– and this, in turn, only exacerbated their irritation with and anger toward America and American culture.  
 
                                                                                                                                                               
cross-Atlantic debate with the United States whereby these intellectuals try to enhance the validity of their criticism 
of America and American policy by ostensibly following in the footsteps of “good,” i.e. internationalist and enlight-
ened, Americans like Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson. 
25Philippe Roger, L’Ennemi Américain, ibid.,  p. 156. According to Roger, the South became a sentimental favorite in 
the right Parisian circles in the era of Napoleon III.  
26For Charles Dickens, see American Notes and Martin Chuzzlewit. For Frances Trollope, see Domestic Manners of 
the Americans. For Evelyn Waugh see Decline and Fall, Vile Bodies and The Loved One. Knut Hamsun’s pro-
peasant and later pro-Nazi views featured a vehement antipathy towards all things American. He had visited the 
United States twice: the first time he worked as a streetcar conductor in Chicago; the second time as a farmhand in 
North Dakota. Joseph de Maistre’s work extols prerevolutionary authoritarianism that spurns liberal democracy and 
can be construed as one of the precursors to the views of Charles Maurras, the fascist editor of L’Action Française. 
For Stendhal, freedom in the United States did not protect against social pressure and did not permit the creation of 
genius in art and politics.  
27Günter Bischof, “Is There a Specific Austrian Anti-Americanism after World War II?” (Unpublished paper pre-
sented at the 2003 conference of the Organization of American Historians [OAH], Memphis, Tennessee, April 6, 2003, 
p. 34.) Bischof writes: “Reading immediate ‘gut-feeling’ internet responses by Austrians on any given day in Der 
Standard or Die Presse indicates raw public opinion among Austrians who read quality newspapers. The letter-to-
the-editor pages in the Neue Kronenzeitung reveal the worst in Austrian anti-Americanism. While anti-Americanism 
may be on the rise in Austria and more lurid in some instances, the old stock images of European and Austrian 
resentment are still the same.” Ibid.   11
  The Nazis’ (as well as most European fascists’) hatred of and contempt for America needs no ela-
boration. America embodied every single social and political dimension that the Nazis found antithetical to 
their very being. To them, America was a mediocre mongrel mass society devoid of culture, ruled by a 
Jewish-dominated East-Coast-based plutocracy whose mission was global domination in politics, eco-
nomics and culture. Bespeaking the attraction of American popular culture for Europe’s masses was the 
fact that the Nazis found it imperative to broadcast jazz, swing and ragtime to their troops during the war 
lest they turn their radio dials to US-Army stations.
28  
 
It is fascinating that the anti-Americanism of the Soviets (and of European communists), though 
very different in tone or content from that of the Nazis, still featured similar tropes. Indeed, a rapproche-
ment between the European left (mainly communist) and the European right (mainly fascist) on the subject 
of anti-Americanism developed throughout the 1930s that unites the extremes of these political orien-
tations to this very day: Les extremes se touchent on anti-Americanism to a degree and historical consis-
tency that they have done on very few, if any, other topics. This was true throughout the so-called “recon-
struction period” of the 1950s, during the protests against the war in Vietnam of the 1960s, the establish-
ment of the new social movements of the 1970s, the opposition to NATO’s double track decision of the 
1980s, and the beginnings of the anti-globalization mobilization during the 1990s. And never has this rap-
prochement become more manifest than in our contemporary post 9/11 world. 
 
  In an earlier work on anti-Americanism in Europe, I developed a fourfold table that establishes 
categories along the lines of left and right on the one hand; and politics and culture on the other. These are 
the narratives that comprise the four fields: Left/Politics: “America, as the world’s foremost capitalist 
country, is engaged in imperialism. It is the leader of world reaction. America is a predatory power which 
is bent on totally controlling the world...” Right/Politics: “America, because of its essentially vulgar na-
ture, is not equipped to be the much-needed leader of the free, White and Western world. Because of its 
lack of traditional elites and its permissiveness, America’s political system is disorganized, confused, and 
completely inappropriate to govern the United States adequately, let alone the world. Thus, Europeans 
would do well not to trust the United States because it is structurally and historically incapable of furnish-
ing serious political leadership. America ultimately is weak, shallow, naive, inexperienced, and no match 
for the adversaries of the free world.” In a sense then, whereas the left fears America’s power by virtue of 
its size and ubiquity, the right disdains American power for its wannabe parvenu character that pretends 
but fails to execute effectively. Left/Culture: “American culture is the expression of an alienated, brutal, 
capitalist society which has produced soulless, plastic, and inauthentic artifacts solely for the profit of huge 
companies. The American ‘culture industry’ produces cheap, essentially worthless things for a quick fix in 
a mass market populated by misguided, manipulated and exploited individuals who are stripped of their 
collectiveness by the inherent divisiveness of a capitalist society...” Right/Culture: “American culture is 
not worthy of the name. The United States, because of its vulgar nature, has never been capable of pro-
ducing anything of lasting value. Worse, it has used its newly acquired financial might to buy real, that is 
European, culture and/or imitate it in a crass style behooving the nouveau riche that the United States will 
always remain. The danger of American culture, however, is its mass appeal which has made it so suc-
cessful among Europe’s masses as well. Thus, American culture is not only worthless and shallow, but 
also dangerous and corrupting by virtue of its universal appeal.” Hence, if the European left has feared 
American power more than has the right, it is exactly the inverse in the realm of culture: here, the right is 
much more worried than the left. But both merge in their dismissal of American culture as “inauthentic” 
with the left seeing this mainly as a consequence of America’s commodified essence whereas the right as a 
result of America’s alleged lack of history and tradition, thus of depth, sophistication and the requisite 
Bildung.
29 
                                                 
28I am grateful to David Buch for this important point. 
29Andrei S. Markovits, “Anti-Americanism and the Struggle for a West Germany Identity,” in Peter H. Merkl, ed.,   12
III. Anti-Semitism as a Constitutive Companion to Anti-Americanism 
 
  While any attempt at a meaningful discussion of anti-Semitism in the present framework would be 
nothing short of intellectually arrogant, the topic needs at least a peripheral mention since in the course of 
the twentieth century it has become one of anti-Americanism’s most consistent conceptual companions, 
perhaps even one of its constitutive features. To be sure, European anti-Semitism preceded anti-
Americanism by centuries. And the two did not emerge as the inseparable tandem that they have now be-
come until the late nineteenth century. However, far and away the most important difference between the 
two is the fact that European anti-Semitism killed millions of innocent people whereas, even in its most 
virulent form, European anti-Americanism rarely, if ever, went beyond the prolific burning of American 
flags and/or the destruction of buildings and property.  
 
  Already in the seventeenth century, well before the establishment of the American Republic, the 
divergent paths that religion took in these two settings – and that still differentiate the United States from 
Europe perhaps more than any other single social, political or cultural factor
30 – also had a major bearing 
on the development of anti-Semitism in these two respective societies, as well as on its role in their rela-
tionship with each other. Whereas Europe’s religious life continued to be ruled by a deeply anti-Semitic 
Catholic Church in the continent’s geographic center and its south, a state-oriented, equally anti-Semitic 
Protestantism mainly of the Lutheran variety in its north (though one would need to differentiate the vehe-
mence of anti-Semitism practiced by German Lutheranism as opposed to its much milder Danish and 
Swedish variants), and a structurally very similar Orthodoxy in its eastern regions, America’s religious life 
featured two characteristics that Europe never had, and the ramifications of which Europeans fail to 
comprehend to this day: first, religion in America was completely decentralized and local. The search for 
political freedom in America was – as Tocqueville so well understood in contrast to other Europeans of his 
time and so many of Europe’s current elites – inextricably tied to the search for religious freedom, thus 
giving religion and religious vocabulary in American politics a completely different meaning than both 
have had in Europe. Second, it featured a Protestantism that professed its great admiration for the Jews, 
that indeed saw itself as a close relative of the Jews, whose ancient writings and customs it extolled. This, 
after all, was the world in which Biblical names such as Elijah, Jeremiah, Jeddediah, Josiah became com-
monplace. The point is that from well before the founding of the American Republic the framework 
wherein people related to Jews and Judaism were profoundly different in America from what they had 
been in Europe. Still, it was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that anti-Semitism 
began to accompany European anti-Americanism in a systematic and regular manner. It was the fear and 
critique of capitalist modernity that brought these two ressentiments together. America and the Jews were 
seen as paragons of modernity: money-driven, profit-hungry, urban, universalistic, individualistic, mobile, 
rootless, hostile to established traditions and values. That it was the fear of modernity linking Jews and 
Americans at this juncture of European ressentiment is best borne out by the fact that Jewish immigration 
to the United States had not yet reached the large numbers that it would twenty years later, and that 
American power in the world was still rather ephemeral. In other words, it was not the actually existing 
United States and its Jews that were feared and disdained but the combination of Judaism and Ameri-
canism as concepts and social trends. After World War I, the Jews as rulers of America became pro-
nounced. It was at this juncture that the notions of Jewish Wall Street, Jewish Hollywood, Jewish Jazz, in 
other words of a thoroughly “Jewified” America became commonplace. It was at this time that all the 
forerunners for current codes such as the “East Coast” were permanently established. From then on, Jews 
and America became inextricably intertwined, not only as representatives of modernity but of holders of 
actual power. America was powerful and the Jews in it even more so. One of the standard staples of Euro-
                                                                                                                                                               
The Federal Republic of Germany at Forty (New York: New York University Press, 1989), pp. 42, 43.  
30On this important difference between the United States and Europe, see the work by Ronald Inglehart and his World 
Value Survey at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.   13
pean anti-Semitism has always been to impute much more power to Jews than they actually have. More-
over, what makes this putative power even more potent is that it is believed to be clandestine and cliquish. 
With America’s real power massively growing after World War I, power as a unifying notion between 
Jews and America became more pronounced and also lasting. The hostile perception of this alleged link 
became as integral to National Socialism as it later did to Stalinism, though with a significantly weaker in-
tensity and less murderous manifestations.  
 
   Things appeared to change after the end of World War II, the Holocaust, the establishment of 
Israel and the Cold War. American power, though still massively resented, became a much-needed pro-
tector against the Soviet Union, its allies and Communism. Probably for the first time in over 900 years, 
the Holocaust rendered overt anti-Semitism socially unacceptable among Europe’s elites.
31 And Jews for 
the very first time in nearly two thousand years actually attained real power by dint of running a state. 
While these structural changes substantially altered the tone and the substance of the discourse about Jews 
and America in Europe, the two remained as intertwined as ever. By the late 1960s, Israel became little 
more than an extension of American power to many, especially on Europe’s political left. Israel was dis-
liked, especially by the left, not so much because it was Jewish but because it was American. And as such 
it was powerful. It is by virtue of this shift in power that contemporary Europeans dislike Israel so in-
tensely and why their current anti-Semitism assumes a different veneer from the traditional one that domi-
nated Europe for one thousand years. As Mark Lilla has so eloquently argued, contemporary Europe’s al-
legedly postnational elites dislike states that behave the way European states used to before 1945: asser-
tively, unilaterally, particularistically, realpolitikally – all of which pertain to Israel’s conduct in the world, 
as well as to America’s, especially under the aegis of the Bush Administration.
32 The fact that current 
European anti-Semitism has changed is best demonstrated by the fact that the very people who are 
ostensibly appalled by anti-Semitic incidents in their own countries are also often Israel’s most ruthless 
critics. That they then often resort to characterizations of Israel’s essence and its very existence – as op-
posed to its policies – in eerily similar terms and tone to the old-fashioned European anti-Semitism of yore 
attests not to the end of European anti-Semitism but merely its mutation from what Daniel Goldhagen so 
aptly calls the Shylock Jew (which is unacceptable in contemporary Europe) to the Rambo Jew (a highly 
legitimate perception).
33 And we all know how much Rambo has become a synonym for America and 
Americans in European discourse of the past two decades. The tough Jew in the form of the omnipotent 
                                                 
31I have been impressed with the work of Richard Landes, who dates European anti-Semitism to the winter of AD 
1010, which brought the first organized massacres of Jews in Europe (France in particular) as a consequence of the 
Muslim Caliph al-Hakim’s destruction of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem. These systematic and politically moti-
vated mass murders occurred in the context of Christianity’s new state-building and modernizing measures that were 
necessary to raise armies to fight the Muslims in the Holy Land. There were, of course, violent actions against Jews 
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characterized the cohabitation of any rival societies and cultures anywhere in the world. See Richard Landes, “What 
Happens when Jesus Doesn’t Come: Jewish and Christian Relations in Apocalyptic Time,” (Unpublished paper, 
Center for Millenial Studies, Boston University, 2000, pp. 1, 2.)  
32Mark Lillla, “The End of Politics,” in The New Republic, June 11, 2003.  
33Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, “The Globalization of Anti-Semitism,” in The Forward, May 2, 2003. The concept of the 
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mainly gangsters and boxers among whom Jews played a prominent role, often to the delight – even pride – of other 
Jews, especially Jewish men. See for example Rich Cohen’s Tough Jews (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), an 
excellent account of the life and world of Jewish gangsters. Paul Breines offers a very different study under the exact 
same title.(Paul Breines, Tough Jews: Political Fantasies and the Moral Dilemma of American Jewry [New York: 
Basic Books, 1990]). In addition to dwelling on Sigmund Freud’s tough Jewish fantasies, Breines argues that the 
fantasy about and the role of the tough Jew increased in direct response to the horrors of the Holocaust and the cre-
ation of the state of Israel which – for the first time in nearly 2000 years – accorded the Jews real power. See for ex-
ample his sections “From Massada to Mossad: A Historical Sketch of Tough Jewish Imagery” as well as “The 
‘Rambowitz’ Novels.”      14
Israeli has led to a new twist on the longstanding interaction between anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism: 
if in former times it was the almighty United States that basically used powerful Israel as its puppet in its 
“imperialist” and “neocolonial” designs, then we witnessed a reversal, especially in the context of the Iraq 
War of 2003, in which an all-powerful Israel and its East Coast minions were alleged to have coopted 
American power for their own purposes. As I mentioned above, anti-Americanism had been perhaps the 
only prejudice in Europewhich correlated positively with the respondents’ level of education and social 
position. One could legitimately voice this prejudice because it inevitably also expressed a critique of – 
often even an opposition to – a very powerful actor. Being prejudiced against the powerful has an entirely 
different social acceptability than being prejudiced against the weak. And this is the position to which the 
new European anti-Semitism has mutated. While it has become illegitimate in the post-Holocaust world to 
express hatred for powerless Jews – meaning Jews currently living in Europe – it has become all the more 
acceptable to express antipathy towards powerful Jews. The former is obvious anti-Semitism which one 
can only express in the pub, the Stammtisch or on the Internet, in other words apart from acceptable public 
discourse. The latter has become a badge of honor and very much forms acceptable public discourse.  
 
Jews have become contested space by dint of the following developments: 
1. The disappearance of communism as an enemy and a perceived threat and thus the need to accord abso-
lute primacy to the task of containing, even defeating, this perceived ill (maybe even evil). This is gone. 
2. Indeed, with the disappearance of communism and the major task at hand to begin coming to terms with 
that past, anti-Semitism has made its periodic appearance in a number of East European countries where 
the old adage of Jews = Bolsheviks has been revived. Somehow, the anti-Semitic dimensions of 
Communist regimes – the Doctors’ Plot in the Soviet Union, the Rajk Trial in Hungary, the Pauker trial in 
Romania, the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia, and the Merker affair in East Germany, to mention but the 
most obvious ones – come up much more rarely when compared to the constant mention of the dispropor-
tionate presence of Jews among the Communist elites. 
3. Because of Communism’s defeat, the immensely decreased need for the United States as a protector. 
This fostered the resurgence of an already present anti-Americanism of which the intellectuals and the po-
litical classes have been the most avid carriers. As is well known, with manifest anti-Americanism, anti-
Semitism has been rarely behind. 
4. What makes them so related is, of course, their being perceived as the quintessential expressions of mo-
dernity. With a massive critique of modernity afoot in Europe – just as in the United States and elsewhere 
– there emerges yet another piece of the puzzle that might explain a necessary, albeit not a sufficient, 
reason for the rise in anti-Semitism in Europe. 
5. Modernity is, of course, also associated with “Europe,” with Brussels, with this new central power of a 
newly-constituting state in this fascinating process of state-building before our very eyes. As we know 
from history, all state-building processes are very painful. Inevitably, there are clear winners and clear 
losers – and the losers do not fade easily. 
The debate about a European identity, about Europe’s constitution, about what will constitute the soul, the 
flesh and blood of this new entity – never mind its skeleton which is now being gradually put into place – 
has not even begun yet. We have no idea what shape it will take, where it will go, who will lead it, who 
will be the winners and losers. 
What is quite clear – to me, at least – is that the enemies of this process have already mustered tropes from 
the past that have not been the most favorable to Jews. 
6. Everything that I said about “Europe” in point 5 pertains to the whole issue of “globalization,” a process 
that has been with us most certainly since the advent of capitalism and the discovery of the Americas in the 
sixteenth century, and that has had many more vastly greater leaps in its history than the one we are 
currently experiencing, some of which – like the one from 1890 until 1920 – changed human existence 
much more profoundly than anything that we are witnessing today. (Fordist mass production, the auto-
mobile, the airplane, antibiotics, the radio, women entering the public arena via the franchise, a major step 
no matter how limited we view it as today [and correctly so], World War I as the most important hiatus   15
between the old, essentially feudal, world and the new capitalist world of what Eric Hobsbawm has aptly 
called the “short twentieth century”). That one of the major responses to this massive transformation was 
the “age of fascism” should not surprise us in hindsight but should give us pause as to what collective so-
cial formations and political manifestations might be still awaiting us in response to the globalization 
phase that we are currently experiencing.  
7. Europe’s multiculturalism. This has a number of dimensions: 
a) The simple fact that as a consequence of the post-Yalta world, borders have opened up and population 
shifts have occurred that Europeans never expected and that exacerbated the earlier immigrations waves of 
the 1960s and 1970s which these states could contain under the guise that these workers were merely 
“guests” or “temporary.” In the 1990s, the whole question of identity and citizenship – of permanent inclu-
sion and exclusion – became central. This changed the tenor of the debate completely. Suddenly, the multi-
culturalism that these Europeans enjoyed in terms of the growing diversity of their culinary possibilities 
mutated into a nasty contest over identity, citizenship, permanence, language, ethnicity, religion – the hot 
buttons of politics. 
b) The empirical reality that a large number of these new immigrants hailed from the Muslim world: 
Turkey (but also Arab countries and Iran) in Germany, The Magreb (Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco) in France, 
Pakistan and the Arab world in Britain, Kurds in Sweden, Albanians in Italy, Moroccans in Spain. While  
these immigrants awakened first and foremost a nasty strain of xenophobia in all European countries 
against themselves, they also have triggered a massive reemergence of anti-Semitism in a twofold way: 
first, on the part of those who hate these newcomers and wish them ill. This is the European anti-Semitism 
of old, “your father’s anti-Semitism”; second, on the part of those who are the targets of this hatred who 
happen to be from cultures where anti-Semitism has attained a major presence mainly – though not 
exclusively – by dint of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
It is not that Muslim anti-Semites and German (or European) anti-Semites suddenly discovered their mu-
tual love for each other – although that has happened too, and is increasingly becoming common in certain 
right-wing circles in Germany and elsewhere in Europe where radical rightists seek out radical Islamists as 
allies even though they hate each other, but in the hierarchy of their respective hatreds that of Jews and 
Americans receives respective pride of place thus fostering this otherwise bizarre alliance – but that anti-
Semitism has yet another voice in these plural and democratic societies where such voices have often 
reached very receptive audiences. By having to adjudicate far-away conflicts on their own soil – i.e. when 
the Middle East conflict is suddenly carried out in the middle of Hamburg, London or Paris – these 
European states invariably and inevitably are drawn into disputes that willy-nilly involve Jews yet again. 
And they do not like it. 
8. Surely one needs to mention Israel’s deeply problematic policies and frequently objectionable actions in 
the occupied territories as irritants to most European publics, elite as well as mass. But here, too, the line 
between completely legitimate criticisms of policies and the much more worrisome questioning of Israel’s 
very existence needs to be strictly delineated. Alas, it is increasingly less so in the commentaries of the 
European public. Be it The Guardian or the French ambassador to Britain, there is increasing irritation and 
impatience with Israel that goes well beyond the country’s policies, and questions the worth of its very 
existence. While such things are nothing new in the worlds of the extreme right and left in Europe and 
have been commonplace since the Six Day War in June of 1967, they were not part of Europe’s accepted 
political discourse until the 1990s. After all, many people have been rightfully upset with many a country’s 
policies. But in virtually no case that I can recall has that led to the questioning of the very worth of that 
country’s existence. Slobodan Milosevic’s Yugoslavia became the bogeyman of Europe’s publics 
(certainly after the slaughter of 9000 Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica) but even this atrocity never led 
any British, French, German or Italian diplomats or journalists writing for these countries’ papers of record 
to question the very right of Yugoslavia to exist as a country. Put crudely, it is becoming clearer by the day 
that the post-Auschwitz “Schonzeit,” as the Germans so aptly have called this era, tellingly using a term 
from hunting which means the “no hunting season” or the “off-limits season,” is gradually coming to an   16
end. The Jews are not “off limits” anymore in Europe.
34 This development reinforces my view that among 
all the prejudices that have beset European history, anti-Semitism has constantly assumed a place all its 
own. It is related to racism but yet different from it, furnishing a category all its own. And it is back with a 
vengeance in acceptable European discourse. “Der Ton macht die Musik,” the tone makes the music. 
Seldom has this been clearer than in the case of contemporary Europe’s irritation with Israel and Jews 
which can never be analyzed by itself but must be done so in a comparative context.  
A new tone has entered among European intellectuals in which criticizing Jews – not merely Israel and Is-
raelis – has attained a certain urgency that reveals a particularly liberating dimension. One can almost hear 
the cries of relief: “Free at last, free at last, we are finally free of this damn Holocaust at last!” In this 
context Europeans posit that Jews, who created a culture of guilt and shame for Europeans, and kept them 
from speaking their minds as they wished, now behave just like they did. The lid is off; Jews are legitimate 
targets yet again. To be sure, anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism are distinguishable: one is a political 
position, the other a prejudice. “Yet the overlap between anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist discourses today is 
considerable, and it is especially striking at a time when many intellectuals, notably the post-modernist left 
and post-colonial theorists, base their work on the very notion of ‘discourse,’ contending that clusters of 
assumptions, embedded in our languages and cultures, pre-select how we think about the world, and mesh 
the production of knowledge and power.”
35 
By constantly bringing up the truly warped and ill-willed analogy of the Israelis with the Nazis, Europeans 
absolve themselves from any remorse and shame and thus experience a sense of liberation. As well, one 
hurts the intended target by equating it with the very perpetrators who almost wiped it off the earth in the 
most brutal genocide imaginable. Above all, all of this needs to be viewed in a comparative context both in 
terms of its tone as well as its substance: as to the former, what is important here is that no other vaguely 
comparable conflict has attained anywhere near the shrillness and acuity as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
If one looks at two much more bloody – and geographically proximate conflicts – the four succession wars 
following the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the Russian wars in Chechnia – neither of them 
have even vaguely created a tone of dismissal, bitterness and contempt for the respective aggressors (the 
Serbs, the Croats and the Russians) among Europe’s intellectuals as have the Israelis. Oxford dons never 
even thought of banning Russian, Croatian or Serbian researchers from their laboratories, as actually 
happened with Israelis. Norwegian veterinarians did not refuse to send DNA samples to institutes that 
requested them if they were in Russia, Serbia or any other country that was engaged in a military conflict, 
or even in measures of undeniable repression and injustice. But they certainly did when a Jerusalem 
institute asked for such samples. The editor of The Translator and Translation Studies Abstract published 
in Britain did not dismiss colleagues from its editorial boards because they belonged to nationalities whose 
countries were engaged in some form of conflict and injustice. But two Israeli academics –both critical of 
the Sharon government and active in Israel’s peace campaigns – were summarily dismissed from this 
board merely for being Israeli citizens. No European intellectuals and academics called for an organized 
boycott of Serbian, Croatian or Russian institutions, including research and cultural links, as did 120 
university professors from thirteen European countries in the case of Israel. Studies by German researchers 
of the tone in which the Israeli-Arab conflict has been reported by the mainstream German media showed 
clearly that there was a marked difference in that the Israelis and their actions were much more frequently 
couched in words with negative and pejorative connotations as compared to the actions by the Arab side, 
which were conveyed in a much more neutral tone. Invariably, Palestinian suicide bombers were 
“nationalists” who acted out of “desperation” whereas Israeli retaliation was inevitably “vengeful” and 
“brutal.” Interestingly, the German media have without any hesitation always depicted the Basque ETA and 
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35Mitchell Cohen, “Auto-Emancipation and Anti-Semitism: Homage to Bernard Lazare,” in Jewish Social Studies, 
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the Irish IRA actions in Spain and Britain respectively as “terrorist.” The passion against Israel is simply 
disproportionate in its tone and its shrillness when compared to other agents of injustice.
36 
 
  This noticeable change in European discourse hails much more from the left than the right. The 
latter – mainly because of the continued illegitimacy and unacceptability of Nazism and fascism in Euro-
pean public opinion – has had a much more circumspect influence on how Jews and Israel are depicted 
than the left has had. Because classical anti-Semitism – certainly in its praxis – was mostly associated with 
the European right, the left enjoyed a certain bonus when it came to discussing all matters relating to Jews 
and Israel. The left could take liberties with being anti-Israeli and anti-Semitic that the right could never 
have. This legitimacy bonus enabled the left to employ anti-Israeli discourse that – in the meantime – has 
become completely common and acceptable parlance in Europe. Because of this general acceptability and 
overall legitimacy, left-wing anti-Semitism is much more relevant and disturbing than right-wing anti-
Semitism, which has essentially remained the same, without major mutations. It thus embodies old-fash-
ioned, i.e. “your father’s anti-Semitism.” Today’s neo-Nazis are ugly and unpleasant, but as they are be-
yond the pale of acceptable European discourse, they are not particularly dangerous in a systemic kind of 
way. The Guardian, the BBC, The Independent – to borrow from the British case which, however, has its 
counterparts in all European countries – have not assumed their overly one-sided language about Israel, 
Jews and the United States under the influence of the National Front, but reflect changes in British and 
European attitudes and the altered nature of discourse among Britain’s and Europe’s intellectuals in the 
wake of the late 1960s. It is by dint of this left-liberal voice, not the right’s old-style anti-Semitism, that 59 
percent of Europeans view Israel as being the greatest threat to global peace, putting this country in first 
place ahead of countries such as Iran, North Korea, the United States, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, in 
that order. China was mentioned by 30 percent, thus ranking it as number 13. Not surprisingly, Europeans 
had the best opinion of themselves, placing Europe as dead last in terms of representing any danger to 
world peace. Only 8 percent of the respondents listed the European Union or any of its members as threats 
to peace with the Germans having the self-confidence (or might it be a bit of selfish arrogance) to list 
themselves dead last at 2 percent. The respondents in the Netherlands were particularly critical of Israel, 
viewing it as a threat to peace by a whopping 74 percent. The equivalent figure in Germany was 65 
percent. Anybody following the European media’s tone in covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since 
the second Intifada in September 2000 will not be surprised by these results. Once again, the origins of this 
hegemonic tone in Europe’s totally acceptable discourse does not hail from the right but from the left. And 
the tone set by elites and opinion leaders, such as journalists, really matter in terms of framing the 
acceptable contours of mass opinion.
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  And this brings us to the difference in substance. It is rather evident that European intellectuals 
and political classes – as well as increasingly the general public – are not so much expressing their sym-
pathies for suppressed Muslims or disadvantaged Arabs as they are their antipathies towards Israel and 
(not so indirectly) the Jews. This is best demonstrated by the following paradox: precisely those Europeans 
who were the most silent during the Bosnian War’s massive slaughter of Muslims at the hands mainly of 
Serbs but also Croats have been among the most vocal opponents of Israel. These people only raised their 
voices in the Bosnian War once the United States intervened. Because the United States intervened on 
behalf of Muslims, many European intellectuals de facto rallied to the side of Slobodan Milosevic, who 
had engaged in mass murder of such Muslims. Thus, antipathy towards Israel and its accompanying anti-
Semitism cannot be separated from a larger enmity towards the United States and what it represents. How 
else can one explain the attitude of Greek intellectuals, politicians, clergy, and public opinion, all of whom 
                                                 
36For a fine paper on the inextricable relationship between recent anti-Americanism and and anti-Semitism, see Yossi 
Klein Halevi’s paper, “Entwined Hatreds: Anti-Americanism,” delivered to a conference on “Anti-Americanism” at 
the Gloria Center, Herzliya, Israel, September 17, 2003. 
37For a solid treatment of this issue, see John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: 
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were rabidly pro-Serbian and vehemently anti-Bosnian Muslim (whom they pejoratively called “Turks”) 
while at the same time they are among the most pro-Arab and Palestinian Europeans? What drives the 
liberal left in Europe is dislike and hatred of Israel and America, and not a genuine sympathy for and 
identification with downtrodden Muslims. It was not the slaughter of innocent Muslim women and 
children that really riled the European left. Instead, what mobilized thousands in the streets of Berlin, 
Paris, and Athens once the much-belated step was taken to intervene on behalf of the brutalized Muslims, 
was once again the American bogeyman. And once again, far right and far left meet on matters relating to 
America and Jews. No far right in Europe has a nastier anti-Serbian history than the German and Austrian, 
both of which have been long-time supporters of the most vicious anti-Serbian fascists in Croatia (the 
notorious “Ustashe”) and elsewhere (primarily Bosnia). Still, their hatred of Serbs could not compete with 
their hatred of Americans, and once the United States intervened against Serbs on behalf of the Bosnian 
Muslims and their Kosovar co-religionists, German and Austrian neo-Nazis and far rightists rallied to 
Milosevic’s side in their unmitigated opposition of NATO’s American-led interventions. “Les extremes se 
touchent” on matters related to Jews and American yet again, as they did so often throughout the twentieth 
century.  
 
  The common trope here – as elsewhere – is mobilized anti-Americanism. When José Bove, the 
anti-globalization leader, joined the Palestinians in Ramallah in the spring of 2002 instead of traveling to 
Gujarat, where many more Muslims were slain in multiple pogroms by Hindu mobs, he did not primarily 
express solidarity with a repressed people and their religion but rather voiced a collective enmity towards 
the United States and everything that it purportedly represents. It is by dint of America’s proximity to Is-
rael that the latter has become such a bogeyman to the anti-globalization movement. We were all witnesses 
to that ugly – but telling – political theater by demonstrators at the Davos meeting in 2003 when one 
person sported a Donald Rumsfeld mask and a yellow Jewish star of David (the kind the Nazis made the 
Jews wear everywhere in German-occupied Europe) with the word “sheriff” on it. His companion  was 
dressed like a cudgel-wielding Ariel Sharon. They and their colleagues danced around a golden calf em-
bodying money and wealth. And surely most, if not all, of the anti-globalist protesters in that scene   
viewed themselves as leftists, not as rightist. Similar openly anti-Semitic iconography was commonplace 
at anti-globalist meetings in Porto Alegre and Durban among others. Clearly, the intensity of the hatred 
borne towards Israel, which goes far beyond a legitimate criticism of its policies, derives in good part from 
Israel being perceived as the complete American proxy, as a de facto part of the United States. And as 
such, any tone – no matter how offensive – is completely legitimate and acceptable since it is directed 
against a very powerful entity rather than a weak minority. But there is also an anti-Semitic dimension to 
this linking of Israel to the United States among the anti-globalization movements. Why Israel, why not – 
say – Saudi Arabia, to which the United States is equally close and which – arguably – has a greater global 
role and influence than does Israel? The answer to this aspect of the puzzle lies not only in Israel’s political 
proximity to the United States but also to the former’s identity as a Jewish state and in the Jews’ 
relationship to Europeans and their history. The Israeli psychologist Zvi Rex once said that the Germans 
will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitz. The issue goes far beyond the Germans and pertains to all of 
Europe. The surplus of enmity exhibited towards Israel by Europeans, the much greater coverage of Israel 
by the European media than any other conflict in the world, including those much closer to Europe, 
bespeaks a qualitative dimension to this sentiment and attitude that borders on an obsession that reaches 
way beyond the conventional criticisms that are accorded to other political conflicts and disagreements. 
Much deeper historical, cultural and psychological forces are at work here. And thus we are back to the 
three standard pillars of classical anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism: Jews, America and modernity.    
 
The substance and tone of public debates really matter. These debates create “frames” that influ-
ence political behavior and can also contribute to enduring elements of political culture. Debates shift the 
boundaries of legitimate discursive space in politics since they define the realm of acceptable terms and 
sanction those who violate them. Debates shape language and create new code words for old ideas, includ-  19
ing prejudices and antipathies. Above all, the ensuing changes in discursive space change how elites and 
ordinary citizens discuss and then think about a topic. Thus, the tone of these debates reflects broader 
ideological shifts in politics and society.
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IV. Europe’s Elite Voices on America from January 1, 1992 Until December 31, 2002: A Crescendo 
of Condescension, Ridicule, Irritation, Ressentiment and A New Sentiment – Schadenfreude 
 
  As part of a larger empirical project on European anti-Americanism, I collected nearly 1000 arti-
cles written on the United States in the four key European countries: Germany, France, Italy, Britain. In 
order to maximize America’s “is” dimension as opposed to its “does” one for my study, I consciously ex-
cluded articles and reports that dealt with overtly political questions, particularly all those related to Ameri-
can foreign policy broadly construed, since it is via its foreign policy that America “does” things most 
overtly to other countries. I concentrated my research on articles about film, theater, food, travel, human 
interest pieces, the descriptions of the iconography of particular events such as party conventions, car 
manufacturing, subway construction and the world of sports. Now, as a child of the 1960s, I realize that 
there is no realm of social or cultural activity – or any activity for that matter – that is not also political. 
But I tried as best I could to eliminate the obviously political from my study precisely to analyze a ressen-
timent against America by Europeans that one could call “surplus” or gratuitous anti-Americanism. This is 
an anti-Americanism for its own sake so to speak, where the invoking of a generalization about the United 
States added little analysis or description to the issue at hand but merely served to reinforce already present 
prejudices instead. My sample included elite as well as other publications in Britain, Germany, France, and 
Italy. The publications that I consulted and analyzed were: The Guardian, The Times, The Independent, 
The Daily Telegraph, The Sunday Times, The Observer in Britain; Le Monde, Le Figaro, Libération, L’Ex-
press, Le Point, L’Equipe in France; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Süd-
deutsche Zeitung, Die Welt, Der Tagesspiegel, die tageszeitung (taz), Die Zeit, Der Spiegel in Germany; 
and Corriere della Sera, La Stampa, La Repubblica, La Gazetta dello Sport in Italy.
39  
 
  Well before George W. Bush became the convenient – and partly appropriate – caricature of the 
American cowboy for the European press, over two-thirds of the collected and analyzed articles included 
some form of irritation with, condescension towards or ridicule of the topic that was being described. 
Overall conclusion: virtually all aspects of American culture – including its highbrow variant – experi-
enced at least one derisive or dismissive comment, even in an otherwise positive review. The term “Ameri-
canization” of whatever the case may be (movies, theater, universities, business practices, habits) was in-
variably invoked in a negative manner and conveyed an undesirable situation as in “Wien darf nicht Chi-
cago werden,” Jörg Haider’s highly successful slogan in an Austrian electoral campaign (Why Chicago? 
Why not Palermo? Liverpool? Or any number of troubled European cities). Or take Gerhard Schroeder’s 
constant invoking of “amerikanische Verhältnisse” (American conditions) as a very powerful bogeyman 
for his successful electoral campaign in 2002. This campaign was the very first in Europe’s postwar his-
tory in which a major – indeed governing – party structured its electoral strategy around a negation of 
America. One hardly needs a more persuasive example for the acceptability of anti-Americanism as a 
potent agent of political mobilization. Above all, America was damned if it did, and damned if it did not. 
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The negative judgement was almost automatically assured independently of the action’s intention, process 
or outcome. 
 
  The world of soccer offers a fine example for my point precisely because, whatever one wants to 
argue about this sport and its culture, it is clear that the United States has been – at best – an also-ran in it 
throughout all of the twentieth century with no power or importance. America simply did not matter – and 
still matters very little. When the World Cup was awarded to the United States for the summer of 1994, 
much of the European press was appalled. Instead of rejoicing that the last important terra incognita for 
soccer was about to be conquered by the “beautiful game,” the usual objections to American crassness, 
vulgarity, commercialism and ignorance were loudly voiced by Europeans – in notable contrast to Latin 
Americans who, if objective criteria and real injustices were to decide predilections and negative opinions, 
have had many more compelling reasons to dislike the United States than do Europeans. Many Europeans 
argued that giving the tournament to the Americans was tantamount to degrading the game and its tradi-
tion. The facilities were denigrated, the organization ridiculed, the whole endeavor treated with derision. 
When the stadia were filled like in no other World Cup tournament before or since, when the level of vio-
lence and arrests was far and away the lowest at any event of this size, the European press chalked this up 
to the stupidity and ignorance of Americans. Of course Americans came to the games, because they like 
events and pageantry, but did they really enjoy and understand the games? Could they ever learn to? When 
more than 60,000 people crowded into Giants Stadium near New York City on a Wednesday afternoon to 
watch Saudi Arabia play Morocco (surely no powerhouses in the world of soccer), this, too, was attributed 
to the vast ignorance of Americans regarding soccer. Indeed, five articles proudly pointed to the fact that 
similar games in soccer-savvy Italy attracted fewer than 20,000 people in the 1990 World Cup held in that 
country. Those few European journalists that bothered to write anything about American sports such as 
baseball which, as always in the summer, was in full swing at the time, had nothing but contempt, derision 
and ridicule for the game: no attempt to engage its traditions, no endeavor to understand it on its own 
terms, just merely yet another vehicle to confirm one’s prejudices about America. Michel Platini, the for-
mer French soccer great of the 1980s and in charge of organizing the subsequent World Cup in France, 
summed up his feelings and judgments in the vernacular of current Europe: “The World Cup in the United 
States was outstanding, but it was like Coca Cola. Ours will be like sparkling champagne.”
40 Surely Platini 
could not have meant to characterize the riots, the violence, the ticket scandals, the racial insults that oc-
curred during the tournament in France as “sparkling champagne.” And it is equally unclear what he meant 
by characterizing the American tournament as “Coca Cola.” The code, however, is clear to all: regardless 
of its actual success and its achievements, the American event was by definition crude and inauthentic 
(like Coca Cola), whereas the French – equally by definition – was inevitably going to be refined and pro-
found (like champagne). 
 
  It was remarkable how differently the European press reported on the World Cup 2002 in Japan 
and South Korea, both newcomers to the world of soccer, just like the United States. Rave reviews were 
accorded to the facilities and organization in both countries. This contrasted sharply to the negative tone 
describing the equivalent structures in the United States in 1994 even though FIFA, for example, and soccer 
officials had nothing but praise for the American effort. What was viewed as kitsch in the American con-
text (the opening ceremony, for example, and other pageantries accompanying the tournament) was lauded 
as artistic and innovative in the Japanese and South Korean equivalent. Lastly, the American team was first 
ridiculed as an incompetent group of players who barely deserved to be in the tournament. The huge upset 
over Portugal was attributed to sheer luck. When Team USA advanced to the second round and then de-
feated its archrival Mexico, the press corps who were vocally rooting for the Mexicans during the game 
remained stunned in silence at the press center. In notable contrast to the positive sentiment that was ex-
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pressed towards Turkey, Senegal and South Korea, the other Cinderella teams of the tournament, nothing 
but bitterness and derision was voiced towards the American team. And when the mighty Germans nar-
rowly (and luckily) beat the Americans in a quarterfinal, some European commentators became genuinely 
alarmed. Quipped one British journalist: “This is terrible. Now they are getting good at this, too. They will 
steal our game. Imagine eleven Michael Jordans running onto the pitch at Wembley. That would be the 
end.” Damned if you do, damned if you don’t – it could not be articulated more clearly: when the Ameri-
cans play poorly, they are irritating merely by doing so and because they are aloof from everybody. When 
they finally play well, they are disliked because they have joined everybody but in doing so have also be-
come threatening.  
 
  This underlying irritation was further confirmed during my many lectures on comparative sports in 
Germany, especially on my two book tours in support of the German edition of my book Offside. In liter-
ally every forum in which I presented my book and work – from university campuses to book stores; from 
rented public halls to semi-private settings; from Saarbrücken in the West to Potsdam in the East – at some 
point the question arose as to whether I did not find it arrogant that the Americans’ sports culture centered 
on baseball, basketball and American football, and did not include soccer; whether indeed this was not yet 
another expression of America’s self-anointed status as being better than the rest of the world. To many 
people my response that this development bespoke America’s different history and its construction of its 
own modernity, which indeed entailed creating its own sports culture, did not allay their suspicions that 
underneath it all there lurked a normative dimension that somehow made America – in the Americans’ 
eyes – better rather than just different. Fears along the lines that Americans might yet prove successful at 
soccer as well merely reinforced the constant malaise with and disdain for the United States regardless as 
to what it actually did or did not do.  
 
  While it was indeed the case – as expected – that left-leaning publications like The Guardian, Le 
Monde, Frankfurter Rundschau and die tageszeitung featured on balance much more negative reporting 
about things American both in style and in content compared to that of their centrist and conservative 
competitors, this was by no means always the case. Precisely because my sample was heavily skewed to-
wards cultural topics and away from conventionally political ones, disdainful language toward and ridicule 
of America was often also quite eminent in such publications as Le Figaro, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeit-
ung, The Times and La Stampa. Notable was the increase in irritation as the decade progressed. Well be-
fore George W. Bush entered the White House and even during Bill Clinton’s presidency, European news-
papers became noticeably more critical of the United States. After all, this was the decade in which the 
French foreign minister Hubert Védrine used every opportunity to inveigh against the United States, this 
new “hyperpuissance.” And with each passing year of the decade more Europeans welcomed his message. 
 
  The negative predisposition ran so deep that even those few American innovations that one would 
expect European progressives to like were deformed into basically negative caricatures. Take affirmative 
action, multiculturalism, feminism and America’s campaign against cigarette smoking. Rather than seeing 
these as impressive steps towards progressive reform, many European commentators – even on the Left – 
decried these as merely mutated expressions of American puritanism, collective control and hysteria. 
Many articles derided these reforms under the rubric of “political correctness.” They warned that American 
universities had been taken over by zealous feminists who dictated a moral code that forbade flirting and 
punished men for complimenting women. Indeed, key French elites all but accused American feminism of 
deviously undermining the purity of the French language. When the French decided to introduce some 
neologisms such as “directrice,” “conseillère” and “Madame la ministre” that feminized hitherto male 
nouns for women holding such positions of distinction, the secretary of the Académie Française, among 
others, opposed these potential changes not only on the ground of tradition and linguistic esthetics but by 
virtue of seeing this unwanted reform as a dark ploy by American feminists who, by way of Québec and 
the successful perversion of the French language used in that Canadian province, were going to undermine   22
surreptitiously the purity of the French language in France proper. Concerning the prominence of women 
in America’s soccer world, to Europeans this was yet another prima facie case for the American penchant 
to subvert, distort and essentially sully a sacred European tradition.  
 
  Article upon article warned of the decline of American universities whose curricula were allegedly 
hijacked by ideological commissars whose task it was to replace Western civilization with politically cor-
rect multiculturalism. Once again, damned if you do, damned if you don’t. If one of the standard staples of 
European complaint against American universities consisted of their alleged elitism, now the alleged oppo-
site was held against them: somehow they seem to have degenerated into institutions wherein standards of 
achievement were completely forfeited for measures governed by political correctness dictated by the un-
qualified. To many European commentators – and their high-brow audiences – America had degenerated 
into a quasi-Orwellian society, following the dictates of a puritanical culture supervised by increasingly 
rigid governmental rules on the one hand, and succumbing to the exigencies of an uncontrolled market 
with no social consciousness whatsoever. America the prudish and the prurient; home of unbridled indi-
vidualism and collectivist conformity; progenitor of Harvard and Hollywood, the former representing the 
very best education that only lots of money can buy, the latter embodying shallow shlock In a sense, ever 
more Europeans began to view America as a different civilization from Europe’s, and surely an inferior 
one.
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  European labor’s anti-Americanism, usually confined to vocal opposition of American capitalism 
and foreign policy, also manifested itself in a clear disdain for American workers. In a detailed study of 
Daimler workers’ attitudes in Stuttgart towards their presumed fraternal colleagues in the Daimler-
Chrysler plants around Detroit, there were no attempts made to hide the contempt and disdain. Chrysler 
workers were characterized as lazy, incompetent, inferior. The Stuttgart crew did not want its allegedly su-
perior products “contaminated” by the shoddy American ways of the Chrysler workers. The contempt did 
not remain confined to the factory gates. Chrysler workers’ home milieus and recreational habits were also 
ridiculed and characterized as inferior.
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  Overall conclusion: virtually all aspects of American culture – including its highbrow variant – 
experienced at least one derisive or dismissive comment, even among the minority of articles that featured 
a positive view towards the issue reported. More than 75 percent of the articles were overwhelmingly 
negative in the presentation of their topic. Most of these exhibited what I have called “gratuitous” or “sur-
plus” anti-Americanism meaning that there were objections lodged which were not immanent criticisms of 
the issue at hand but rather catered to a pejorative generalization of America or Americans that had little 
bearing on the immediate topic. The term “Americanization” of whatever the case may be (movies, theater, 
universities, business practices, habits, subway construction, car manufacturing, sports) was almost always 
invoked in a negative manner and conveyed a clearly undesirable situation. Even beyond the United States 
itself, many adversities in Europe are conveniently associated with America. When a crazed teenager gun-
ned down his classmates and teachers in Erfurt, much of the subsequent German debate blamed an alleged 
“Americanization” of German youth, society and culture for this tragedy.  When an extreme heat wave tor-
mented Europeans, articles appeared decrying the “Americanization” of Europe’s climate. Americans were 
to blame when the dollar was high, just as they were to blame when the dollar was low. Thus Gerhard 
Schroeder’s constant invoking of “amerikanische Verhältnisse” as a negative icon for effective political 
mobilization made perfect sense for his successful electoral campaign in 2002. “Americanization” of any-
thing has in the meantime developed such a solid basis of pejorative connotations in Western Europe that it 
pays for politicians to use this sentiment as an agent of mobilization and legitimation.      
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   September 11 added a hitherto underdeveloped sentiment to this anti-American mix – that of 
Schadenfreude. One always hears on this side of the Atlantic how Europe’s good will towards the United 
States immediately following 9/11 was squandered by the Bush Administration’s aggressive unilateralism. 
True for the masses, not true for the elites, who had no such good will to squander. Never before was the 
cleavage between the views of Europe’s elites and its masses concerning America clearer than in the 
immediate wake of that tragedy. While, on the whole, Europe’s mass opinion was deeply sympathetic 
towards Americans (New Yorkers in particular) and empathized with Americans as victims, Europe’s 
elites – especially its cultural ones – by and large did neither. Ground Zero was still burning when the first 
reports in the quality media initiated all the arguments, objections, analyses, conjectures, conspiracy 
theories and open rejoicing that have become commonplace: that the Americans clearly had it coming to 
them; that this was justified payback for all American misdeeds of the past, from Vietnam to globalization, 
from exterminating the Native Americans to Dresden (two often-voiced staples of the German reaction as 
expressed repeatedly in taz, Der Spiegel, Frankfurter Rundschau, radio and television talk shows, and the 
Römerberggespräche in Frankfurt to mention but a few venues); that this was no big deal since many more 
Americans die in yearly traffic accidents; that, if anything, the destruction of the Twin Towers improved 
New York’s skyline; that the Israeli Mossad was behind it all since many Jews stayed away from work that 
day lest they be killed; that it was all a ploy by the American government to obtain a carte blanche for its 
imperialist endeavors, very similar to the burning of the Reichstag in February of 1933 that led to the 
consolidation of the Nazi dictatorship (again, often voiced in Germany, though not exclusively there); that 
George W. Bush and Osama bin Laden were identical in their mental makeup and their (mainly religious) 
fanaticism, basically mirror images of each other, just as the United States in its religious revivalism was 
not a real democracy but in fact resembled the theocratic fanaticism of the Islamists. Just as the Israeli 
psychiatrist Zvi Rex was completely correct in saying that the Germans will never forgive the Jews for 
Auschwitz, so, too, will they never forgive the Americans for being daily reminders that it was they – 
together with the Red Army – who defeated Nazism, not the Germans. By year’s end, bookstores in Paris, 
Berlin and London were full of publications that – basically – rejoiced at the tragedy of 9/11. In France, 
Thierry Meyssan’s L’Effroyable Imposture (The Terrible Fraud), which argued that the crime of 9/11 was 
totally committed by the American government, made it to the top of the charts and became a steady 
bestseller. Ditto Mathias Broecker’s – a former taz editor’s – book with an identical theme that sold 
130,000 copies for a very small German publisher in less than eight months and remained on various 
bestseller lists for many more. Examples abound wherein a significant voice of Europe’s intellectuals and 
elites expressed a virtually unveiled Schadenfreude in America’s woes: for Baudrillard the destruction of 
the Twin Towers was the fulfillment of a long-held dream; for Stockhausen it was a great piece of art. And 
the rhapsodization by European intellectuals goes on and on. A close reading of Jean-Marie Colombani’s 
editorial in Le Monde of September 12 entitled, “Nous Sommes Tous Américains,” which has been touted 
as a major statement of solidarity with the United States, reveals quite the opposite: Colombani accuses the 
Americans of being the progenitors of Osama Bin Laden and thus the godfathers of Jihaddist terrorism. 
Permit me to submit the following telling counterfactual: had the Air France Airbus A-300 Flight 8969 on 
December 24, 1994, crashed into the Eiffel Tower in Paris, as the Groupe Armée Islamique wanted it to, I 
doubt very much that any – let alone many – American intellectuals would have written lengthy pieces in 
prestigious publications like The New York Times or The Washington Post by, say, December 26 and 27 all 
but exculpating this crime by invoking France’s many military and political missteps as well as its 
atrocities, from the Vendée to the Paris Commune, from Indochina to Algeria. Nor would they have 
invoked all kinds of conspiracy theories involving the French government, the Israeli Mossad or any of the 
other agents so often mentioned in connection with 9/11. I doubt very much that books purporting that 
such a crime was actually planned and executed by the French president – had this terrible tragedy become 
reality – would have been written by American intellectuals, let alone become bestsellers in the United 
States. But all of this has indeed happened in Europe, particularly among social groups from whom one   24
would least expect it by dint of their intelligence and education. Clearly, antipathy, as has often been the 
case, trumps either and both.  
 
   It was payback time for Mr. Big’s arrogant attitude and demeanor, for his general misdeeds like 
imperialism as well as specific ones like the bombing of Dresden, but above all simply for his being big. 
To be sure, everybody hates Mr. Big in any contexts, be it in politics or in the classroom, be it Manchester 
United, the New York Yankees, or Harvard.
43 Alas, Schadenfreude is a very human trait which in fact 
gains in respectability and legitimacy when it pertains to the suffering of a perceived giant. That the widely 
held and vocally expressed Schadenfreude and anger pertaining to 9/11 quickly shifted from Europe’s in-
tellectuals and elites to a significant percentage of the population is best demonstrated by opinion polls, 
which clearly reveal that by the summer of 2003, for example, one-third of Germans under age thirty be-
lieved that the U.S. government sponsored the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington. 
About 20 percent of the entire German population agreed with this view, according to the same survey.
44 
And when as serious a person as Andreas von Buelow, former state secretary in an SPD-led government, 
writes a very successful book touting these views and when conspiracy theories deeply steeped in anti-
Americanism and anti-Semitism are entering the mainstream in Germany and France, then this clearly 
constitutes a serious matter.   
 
V. From Ressentiment to Rebellion? The Political Function of Anti-Americanism in Europe’s State-
Building Process 
 
  So what? What does it matter that Europe’s elites, particularly its “chattering classes,” disdain the 
United States? As this work has argued, there seems to be nothing new here. And yet, it seems to me, the 
spillover from elite to mass opinion delineated by the aforementioned survey does in fact represent a new 
situation at this particular juncture in Europe’s political development. Whereas there still was a clear dis-
connect between elite and mass opinion in Europe following the 9/11 tragedy, there emerged a hitherto un-
precedented congruence in opinion of all constituents concerning the war in Iraq. In no other instance that I 
can recall in Europe’s postwar development did such a complete convergence of views emerge between 
elites and masses, between government and opposition, among voices on the left and the right, as occurred 
in France and Germany, in particular, during the four months of build-up to the war with Iraq. I would go 
so far as to characterize the public voice and mood in these countries, but in others as well, as “gleich-
geschaltet.” What rendered this Gleichschaltung so different from those that accompany most dictatorships 
was its completely voluntary, thus democratic, nature. Everyone united in their opposition to what Ameri-
ca was about to do. While the thrust of this antagonism focused on America’s actions, its amazing passion 
was deeply anchored in what Europeans perceived as America’s very core, its identity. To many Euro-
peans, even in the countries where the governing elites maintained the deeply unpopular position of sup-
porting the United States in its imminent war with Iraq – Britain, Spain and Italy come to mind – America 
had become the “un-Europe,” a clear “other.” This othering was, of course, not totally new and had many 
precedents. Well before the arrival of the Bush Administration, even under the aegis of Bill Clinton, whom 
European intellectuals embraced wholeheartedly as a kindred spirit – particularly during the Lewinsky 
scandal and the ensuing impeachment proceedings – Europeans commenced the conscious construction of 
Europe being America’s other. “Europe: The Un-America” proclaimed Michael Elliott in an article pub-
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lished in Newsweek International in which he dismissed any semblance of a common transatlantic civiliza-
tion.
45 Many European intellectuals, particularly in France, Germany, Britain and Italy basically appro-
priated Samuel Huntington’s famous and controversial notion of the “clash of civilizations,” with which 
they characterized what they perceived as the increasing divergence between Europe and the United States 
and not – pursuant to Huntington’s original – a clash between the predominantly Christian West and the 
Islamic world.
46 The widely voiced indictment accused America of being retrograde on three levels: moral 
(America being the purveyor of the death penalty and of religious fundamentalism, as opposed to Europe’s 
having abolished the death penalty and adhering to an enlightened secularism); social (America being the 
bastion of unbridled “predatory capitalism” to use the words of former German Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt and of punishment as opposed to Europe being the home of the considerate welfare state and of 
rehabilitation); and cultural (America the commodified, Europe the refined; America the prudish and 
prurient, Europe the savvy and wise.)
47 It was well before George Bush was close to running for president 
that French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine inveighed against the United States as a “hyperpower” – 
hyperpuissance – which needed to be brought down by an “un-American” Europe obviously led by France. 
To Hubert Vedrine the clarion call of Europe’s rise against the United States centered on the following 
American ills that all good Europeans had to fight tooth and nail: “ultraliberal market economy, rejection 
of the state, nonrepublican individualism, unthinking strengthening of the universal and ‘indispensable’ 
role of the U.S.A., common law, anglophonie, Protestant rather than Catholic concepts.”
48 The Kultur-
kampf had commenced long before George W. Bush’s arrival in the White House. Indeed, this very term is 
often used as a rallying cry by German intellectuals and cultural elites in their battle against the United 
States. Overt hostilities in language and attitude that have remained taboo against any other culture or 
country among European intellectuals and elites have attained acceptability when it concerns America. As 
I stated at the outset of this work, overt anti-Americanism has become a badge of honor in certain Euro-
pean circles. Thus, a well-known German director: “Kulturkampf? Count me in. I am deeply detest Amer-
ica.”
49 Or take the British novelist Margaret Drabble: “My anti-Americanism has become almost uncon-
trollable.”
50  
 
  To be sure, the Bush Administration’s actions intensified this Kulturkampf and legitimated it 
among European publics to a degree unimaginable before. Scheler reminds us that ressentiment can linger 
and fester, thus becoming ever more consuming of the subject who holds this sentiment. It thus remains 
solely a negative and destructive force. Or, conversely, it can transform itself into rebellion which – so 
Scheler – always necessitates the affirmation of counter-values as the first positive step towards the 
construction of a new identity.
51 No mobilization around these European counter-values could have been 
more emphatic than the huge demonstrations on Saturday, February 15, 2003. As never before in Europe’s 
history – not in the halcyon days of August 1914 when Europe’s armies marched into slaughter against 
each other, nor the end of World War II nor the fall of communism – did so many millions of Europeans 
unite in public on one day for one purpose. From London to Rome, from Paris to Madrid, from Athens to 
Helsinki, from Berlin to Barcelona, Europeans across most of the political spectrum united in their opposi-
tion to the impending American attack on Iraq. And sure enough, a number of European intellectuals pro-
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claimed this day as the one that historians will someday view as the true birthday of a united Europe pre-
cisely because, like no other day in European history, it united Europeans emotionally and not only by fiat 
of a faceless bureaucracy issued in impenetrable language from Brussels.  
 
  At least to my knowledge, the first and most emphatic interpretation of February 15, 2003, as 
Europe’s nascent national holiday was offered by Dominique Strauss-Kahn in a lengthy article in Le 
Monde. Strauss-Kahn could not have been more explicit straight at the outset of his piece: “On Saturday, 
February 15, 2003, a nation was born on the streets. This nation is the European nation.”
52 Every facet of 
Strauss-Kahn’s article makes it unmistakably clear that the only commonality of this nascent nation lies in 
its opposition to the United States. Lest there be any misunderstanding that this pertains only to policy in-
terpretations, political rivalries or differences in interest, Strauss-Kahn leaves absolutely no doubt that he 
sees the chasm between Europe and the United States as a matter of values, identity, essence. While these 
might be negotiable on a superficial level, they are deeply irreconcilable dimensions that obviously clash 
with each other. Barely two month later, Jürgen Habermas entered the fray with a hitherto unprecedentedly 
coordinated endeavor: As a number of commentators remarked, only a man of Jürgen Habermas’s stature 
could have pulled off a Europe-wide publication event of this magnitude. On May 31, 2003, Habermas 
published an article on Europe’s rebirth following the war in Iraq in Germany’s paper of record, the Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung. Coauthored with the world-famous French intellectual Jacques Derrida, a 
French version of this piece was also published in Libération. On the very same day, Habermas’s friend, 
the American intellectual Richard Rorty, published a supportive piece in Süddeutsche Zeitung, Germany’s 
other paper of record and the FAZ’s main rival. Adolf Muschg wrote in the eminent Swiss paper Neue Zür-
cher Zeitung, Umberto Eco in Repubblica, Gianni Vattimo in La Stampa, and Fernando Savater in El Pais. 
Excepting the Habermas-Derrida article in FAZ and Libération, all other contributions were completely in-
dependent articles united only by one common theme: the war in Iraq was to be the auspicious beginning 
of a European nation. While all pieces dwelt on the United States being Europe’s “other,” Eco deviated 
from this accusatory tone by arguing that the United States – far from being this hotly desired “other – was 
merely different, just like it had always been, and was always going to be.” Exhibiting a sobriety in tone 
that none of the other contributions possessed, Eco warned the Europeans that the major problems awaiting 
the continent could never be solved merely by rallying around the negative moment of opposing the United 
States, as was increasingly the case in many European circles among intellectuals, the political class and – 
for the first time – increasingly the public as well. Particularly disappointing to me was the obviously con-
scious exclusion of intellectuals from Britain, the Scandinavian and Low Countries, and – most of all – 
Eastern Europe. Indeed, even a cursory reading of the Habermas-Derrida text which – by the authors’ own 
admission – was largely penned by Habermas alone, reveals how much this allegedly European vision is 
little more than an undisguised advocacy of a Franco-German core that is to lead Europe away from its 
tutelage to the United States. Habermas speaks openly about a “vanguard” (“avantgardistisches”) core 
Europe. Apart from the text’s haughty dismissal of other options and its complete disregard for East Euro-
peans and their five-decade-long experience under Communist rule, it is remarkable how German-centered 
this manifesto is, particularly given its author’s bona fide standing as a genuine Weltbürger. Tellingly, the 
only European politician whom Habermas mentions explicitly by name is Joschka Fischer, Germany’s for-
eign minister. Habermas centers his entire argument on the alleged hegemony of the following clearly 
preferable European values that he juxtaposes – implicitly, though obvious to any reader – to their natural-
ly inferior American counterparts: a large dosage of skepticism towards the market combined with an ac-
ceptance of the state as a major social actor; a cautious attitude towards technology; a secular conviction 
that rejects any kind of religiosity in public life. These alleged European virtues have been the staples of 
Europe’s debate about America and Americanism at least since 1945, if not before. Many European intel-
lectuals – like Hubert Vedrine, as mentioned above – have listed them well before Habermas. But as Jür-
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gen Kaube in a brilliant critique of Habermas points out, many of the values that Habermas claims for 
Europe do not pertain: few entities are more market-driven than the European Union; the French, Swedes 
and Belgians certainly do not share the Germans’ fears of technological progress; and religion in Poland, 
Spain or Ireland certainly continues to play an important role in public life. Kaube concludes that Haber-
mas really refers to mainly German values, which he then blithely extrapolates to the rest of Europe.
53 Jan 
Ross, another of Habermas’s critics, correctly observes that Habermas’s view of European values closely 
resemble those of the old Bonn Republic and of the old EU before the fall of the Berlin Wall.
54 This indeed 
is eerily true but with one major exception: after all, it was Jürgen Habermas more than any other German 
intellectual who always argued that the greatest achievement of the old Bonn Republic was its uncondi-
tional acceptance of the West in all its forms: cultural, social, political. And it was obvious to anybody 
who listened at the time that the West for Habermas not only included but actually featured the United 
States. For Habermas, too, apparently, one aspect of “othering” the United States in the current European 
development is to claim a strong affinity with the “genuine” United States that over the past decade or so 
seems to have lost its way. Thus, for liberals of Habermas’s normative predilections at least, the new 
Europe is not only the “un-America” but actually a sort of “ur-America” 
 
VI. Conclusion  
 
  At the end of the day the debate about America and the various views of and attitudes towards 
America by Europeans have little to do with the “real existing America” itself and everything with Europe. 
It is far from certain in which direction the anti-Americanism analyzed in this work will proceed, since it 
remains equally uncertain where, how, perhaps even if and whether Europe will develop. But one thing 
remains quite telling: nobody ever spoke of Europe’s birth being the fall of the Berlin Wall or the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union and its communist rule over the eastern half of the continent. And true enough, 
none of those events attained nearly the popular enthusiasm that February 15, 2003, clearly did. Then, in 
1989-1990, while Berliners danced in the streets, Londoners and Parisians fretted in their homes. And no-
body in Europe’s West thronged any public place in support of the celebrations in Warsaw and Prague. 
Whether Strauss-Kahn, Habermas and their friends will prove correct in that this day will indeed become 
Europe’s national holiday, only future historians will be able to ascertain for certain. One thing is clear, 
though: the long tradition of a deep ambivalence towards and a constant preoccupation with America in 
Europe clearly set the intellectual stage for the powerful symbolic presence of this potentially fateful day. 
History teaches us that any entity – certainly in its developing stages – only attains consciousness and self-
awareness by defining itself in opposition to another entity. Every nationalism arose in opposition to an-
other. With the entity of “Europe” now on the agenda, anti-Americanism may well serve as a useful 
coagulating function for the establishment of this new entity and become a potent political force on the 
mass level way beyond the elites’ antipathy and ressentiment that has been a staple of European intel-
lectual life since July 5, 1776, if not before.     
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